In this article, we concern a kind of partially observed non-zero sum stochastic differential game based on forward and backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). It is required that each player has his own observation equation, and the corresponding open-loop Nash equilibrium control is required to adapted to the filtration that the observation process generated. To find this open-loop Nash equilibrium point, we prove the maximum principle as a necessary condition of the existence of this point, and give a verification theorem as a sufficient condition to verify it is the real open-loop Nash equilibrium point. Combined this with reality, a financial investment problem is raised. We can obtain the explicit observable investment strategy by using stochastic filtering theory and the results above.
Introduction

Historical contribution
The general theory of backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) was first introduced by Pardoux and Peng [18] . For the BSDE coupled with a forward stochastic differential equation (SDE), it is so-called the forward and backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) , which has important applications in many areas in our society. In stochastic control area, the Hamiltonian system is one of the form of FBSDEs. More essentially in financial market, the famous Black-Scholes option pricing formula can be deduced by a certain FBSDE. Some research based on FBSDE is surveyed by Ma and Yong [11] .
In stochastic control theory, one can use control to reach a maximum or minimum objection based on stochastic differential system. Peng [19] firstly considered the maximum principle of convex domain forwardbackward stochastic control system. In the following, Xu [34] dealt with a case that control domain doesn't need to be convex and there is no control variable in diffusion coefficient in the forward equation. In more general case, Tang and Li [22] considered that the control domain is non-convex and diffusion coefficient contains control variable. Moreover, Shi and Wu [20] , [21] solved the corresponding fully-coupled case, etc. All these previous work were based on the "complete information" case, meaning that the control variable is adapted to the truth complete filtration. In reality, there are many cases the controller can only obtains "partial information", reflecting in mathematics that the control variable is adapted to the filtraion generated by an observable process. Based on this phenomenon, Xiong and Zhou [33] dealt with a MeanVariance problem in financial marcket that the investor's optimal portfolio is only based on the stock and bond process he observed. This assumption of partial information is indeed natural in financing market. What's more, Wang and Wu [25] considered the Kalman-Bucy filtering equation of FBSDE system. Huang, Wang and Xiong [7] dealt with the backward stochastic control system under partial information. Wang and Wu [26] , Wu [31] , Wang Wu and Xiong [27] solved the partially observed case of forward and backward stochastic control system.
The game theory was firstly constructed by Von Neumann since 1928. Nash [12] - [15] made the fundamental contribution in the Non-cooperate Games, considered there are N-players acting independently to maximize their own objective conducted. He gave the notion of equilibrium point. Then, Isaacs [9] , Basar and Olsder [2] conducted the game research on differential equation system. Varaiya [24] , Eliott and Davis [3] considered the stochastic case. Next, many articles of forward stochastic differential games which is based on SDEs appeared, like Hamadene [4] - [6] , Karoui and Hamadene [10] , Wu [30] , Øksendal [1] , etc. For the backward case, Yu and Ji [36] studied the Linear Quadratic (LQ) system, Wang and Yu [28] gave the maximum principle of backward system. Øksendal and Sulem [16] , Hui and Xiao [8] had a research on the maximum principle of forward-backward system. Recently, Tang and Meng [23] solved the partial information case of zero-sum forward and backward system. Wang and Yu [29] solved the partial information case of non-zero sum backward system, etc.
In our article, we generate game theory to the partially observed non-zero sum forward-backward system. The main difference here is that, we suppose every player has his own observation equation, not just as partial information that focusing only on a smaller sub-filtration. In section 1, we introduce some historical contributions and make notions we need. In section 2, we establish the necessary condition of maximum principle for Nash equilibrium point and give a sufficient condition (verification theorem) to help us check if the candidate equilibrium points are real. In section 3, we consider a reasonable financial investment problem and use the theorems in section 2 to obtain the open-loop Nash equilibrium point and give the explicit observable solution of investment strategy.
Basic Notions
Throughout our article, we denote (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P) the complete probability space, on which (W (·),
What's more, we denote the 1-dimensional Euclidean space by R, the Euclidean norm by | · |, and the transpose of matrix A by A τ , the partial derivative of function f (·) with respect to x by f x (·). We also denote the L 2 F (0, T ; S) representing the set of S-valued, F t -adapted square integrable process (i.e. E T 0 |x(t)| 2 dt < ∞), and the L 2 F (Ω; S) representing the set of S-valued, F -measured square integrable random variable. In the following discussion, we only consider 1-dimensional case if there is no specific illustration.
Problem formulation
We consider a partially observed stochastic differential game problem of forward-backward stochastic systems, focusing on necessity and sufficiency of the existence of open-loop Nash equilibrium point.
We formulate the controlled forward and backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) as
where v 1 (·), v 2 (·) are two control processes taking values in convex sets
is a F T measurable square integrable random variable. Here for simplicity, we omit the notation of ω in each process.
We regard v 1 (·), v 2 (·) as two strategies of player 1 and 2. For both of them, they cannot observe the process x(·), y(·), z 1 (·), z 2 (·) directly. However, they can observe their own related processes Y 1 (·), Y 2 (·), which satisfy the following equations
where
is a continuous map. We define the filtration F i t = σ{Y i (s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t}, i = 1, 2 as the information for player i obtained at time t, and the admissible control
where U i , i = 1, 2 is called the open-loop admissible control set for player i.
From the Hypothesis(H1), we can defined a new probability measure P v1,v2 by
Equivalently, it can be written in the SDE form
(·)) is a 2-dimensional controlled Brownian motion and Y j (·), j = 1, 2 turn out to be a stochastic observation process.
Based on the construction above, we define two cost functional under space (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P v1,v2 ).
for two players i = 1, 2, where E v1,v2 is the corresponding expectation.
In this cost functional, it contains the running cost part representing an utility in duration, and the terminal and initial representing the restrict on the endpoints.
Hypothesis(H2). Suppose functions
For each of the player, his goal is to minimise his own cost. Here we set (
In this definition, (u 1 , u 2 ) is the well-known open-loop Nash equilibrium point of our partially-observed forward-backward non-zero sum system, and (x, y, z, z 1 , z 2 , Z) is the corresponding equilibrium state process. Similar to the optimal control, what we want to do is to find this equilibrium control. We denote the whole problem above as Problem(NEP).
In particular, If we set
In that case, the reward of player 1 is actually the cost of player 2, and the sum is always zero. We can regard it as a special case of non-zero sum game. We define this problem of our system as Problem(EP).
(·), j = 1, 2 to be a F t -Brownian motion under P, then the distribution of observation process Y (·) will be depending on the control process. In that way, our admission control is adapted to a controlled filtration, which appears a circulation. Here, we break through the circulation by Girsanov theorem, making observation process to be an uncontrolled stochastic process and depict the controlled Brownian motion under related equivalent probability measure.
Maximum principle
In this section, we will establish the necessary condition (maximum principle) of existence of open-loop Nash equilibrium point in problem (NEP), and give a sufficient condition (verification theorem) of a special class of system.
Variational equation
For any ǫ ∈ [0, 1], we make the variational controls as
as the corresponding state processes of variation (u
It is noteworthy that when using the variational technique, we had better require the Brownian motion do not affected by the control process. Then our state equation can be written as
Then we have the following estimates under Hypothesis (H1).
where C, K is constant independent of ǫ.
10)
12)
for i = 1, 2., where C is constant independent of ǫ.
For notation simplicity, we set
We introduce the following variational equations
(2.14)
From Hypothesis (H1), we know that (2.13) and (2.14) exist a unique solution respectively. Next, we make the notation
Then we have
Proof. We only consider the first two case for i = 1. The rest are similar and are well-known results.
(i).
Thus we have
where C is a constant. From Hypothesis (H1), we know that the right side of the inequality converges to 0 when ǫ → 0. The case of i = 2 is similar.
(ii).
Variational inequality
From the definition of open-loop Nash equilibrium point (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) in Problem (NEP), it is clear that
From (2.24), we can derive the variational inequality.
Lemma 2.4.
Proof. we only consider the case i = 1. From (1.7), we have
According to Lemma 2.3 and Hypothesis (H2),
(2.29) Similarly, we have
(2.30) From the definition of Γ(·) and (2.28)-(2.30), we derive the variational inequality.
A necessary condition (maximum principle)
In the following, we ignore the superscript of W u1,u2 j (·), j = 1, 2 for notation simplicity. We formulate adjoint equaions under probability measure P u1,u2 .
(2.32) It is noteworthy here that W j (·), j = 1, 2 is the Brownian motion under probability measure P u1,u2 . Due to the observation equation (1.2) and the appearance of W v1,v2 j (·) and Y j (·), j = 1, 2 in the forward-backward state equation (1.1), the equation (2.32) is not the classic form any more. Also we should introduce equation (3.25) to deal with the controlled probability measure P v1,v2 or expectation E v1,v2 related to observation process when using the variational method. Now we give the necessary condition.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose (H1) and (H2) hold, (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium point of problem (NEP), and (x, y, z, z 1 , z 2 ) is the corresponding state process, then we have
e.. Here we set
34)
Proof. We only consider the i = 1 case. Applying Itô's formula to q 1 (·)x
(2.37) and
(2.38) Substituting (2.36)-(2.38) into variational inequality, we get
We setw
Thus we get
The prove of case i = 2 is similar.
In the following remarks, we discuss some special cases in the system of our problem (NEP). 
where it doesn't contain the W u1,u2 j (·) part. Then, It is a special case that σ j (·) ≡ k j· (·) ≡ 0. According to the theorem 2.1, the necessary condition becomes:
(2.50)
The adjoint process are changed to where
54)
and the corresponding adjoint equations (3.25), (2.32) are unchanged.
Remark 2.5. As mentioned in Remark 1.1, the main obstacle in the construction of the partially observed system is that if observation variable Y (·) relies on control variable, the control will adapted to a controlled filtration, and the dY (·) part will be affected by convex variational method. Here, if we consider the special case that
is uncontrolled process naturally. Thus we don't need to use Girsanov theorem to reconstruct the system. We set W v1,v2 j (·) = W j (·) to be the B.M. under probability measure P v1,v2 = P straightly. In that way, the adjoint process P (·) is needless for the reason that control doesn't affect the observation equation any more.
Thus the Hamiltonion in theorem 2.1 becomes the classic form below
56)
with adjoint process satisfies
(2.58)
A sufficient condition (verification theorem)
Here we establish the sufficient condition of the case when the observation process is not affected by the control process. Just as Remark 2.5, we suppose h(t, x(t), v 1 (t), v 2 (t)) = h(t, x(t)) and (W (·),
is a standard B.M. on probability space (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P).
Theorem 2.2. Suppose hypothesis (H1) (H2) hold, and the adjoint equation (2.57) admits a solution
(2.60)
are convex functions respectively. Then, (u 1 (·), u 2 (·)) is the open-loop Nash equilibrium point.
Proof. We only prove the case of i = 1. For ∀v 1 (·) ∈ U 1 , we have
(2.63)
Due to γ 1 (y) is convex on y,
(2.67)
Moreover, we have
(2.68)
From A, B, C,
Similarly, we can prove the case when i = 2,
An example in finance
In this section, we consider a realistic investment problem in our financial market. We can solve it by using the necessary and sufficient condition we derived in section 2, and give the related Nash equilibrium strategy explicitly. We assume that there are n + 1 assets can be continuously traded in financial market. 1 bond dB(t) =r(t)B(t)dt,
τ is appreciation rate of the stock process. The n × n matrix valued process Σ(t) = (σ ij (t)) is the volatility coefficients of the stock process. We set S(·) = (S 1 (·), . . . , S n (·)) τ . We make the following assumptions. Hypothesis (H3). µ(·) is F t -adapted bounded process, r(·) and σ ij (·) are deterministic bounded coefficients. Σ(·) has full rank for ∀t ∈ [0, T ], and the inverse matrix Σ(·) −1 is bounded. We suppose that there is a company hires two managers. Each of them observes few stocks from S(·).
where n k is the dimension of observed stocks
, which are parts of real stock process S(·) corresponding to the two managers respectively. Thus, we denote the rest of both unobservable part of stock process as
τ , which can be also invested by company.
are the corresponding mutually independent n k -dimensional Brownian motions (see Theorem 3.1 in Xiong and Zhou [33] ). For calculation simplicity, we might as well suppose there is no common B.M. among the vectors W k (·), k = 0, 1, 2 and no common observed stock between two managers. If not, it will not cause any trouble during calculation but more redundant to be represented. In that way, we have n 0 + n 1 + n 2 = n. We set µ
. . , n k , k = 0, 1, 2 to be the corresponding appreciation rate and volatility of stock process S k (·). Further, we make the assumption naturally that the appreciation rate µ k (·) is unobservable for k = 0, 1, 2. We denote a
By using Itô's formula, our observation equation turns to
be the available filtration to each manager. In that case, r(·), Σ(·) are all completely observable, while µ(·) is unobservable.
Here we assume that the n k -dimensional drift process µ k (·), k = 1, 2 of each observation equation is the solution of the following stochastic equation
. is the n k -dimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with mean reverting drift.
We assume the company plans to obtain a terminal wealth ξ, which is a F t -adapted non-negative random variable satisfying E|ξ| 2 < ∞. Now the whole wealth of the company is denoted by y(·). The first manager invests π where I 1 (·), I 2 (·) are represented to the instantaneous capital injection of each manager to guarantee the terminal wealth of the company.
For each of them, their mission is to use the minimal capital injection wealth and the minimum start-up capital to make sure the company reach the ultimate wealth. Meanwhile, any one of them has his own utility on their injection process. The more capital he uses, the danger he undertakes. So we can define the related utility function for each manager. where L i , M i are two positive constants, β is the discount rate. We define the risk-seeking running cost as a criteria for injection utility. To attain the terminal wealth, they want to minimize both of the injection utility and the start-up wealth value. That is From η 1 (·) in (3.7), b 1 (t) in (3.15), we find that η 1 (t)p 1 (t) − η 1 (t) p 1 (t) = Σ 1 (t) −1 µ 1 (t)p 1 (t) − µ 1 (t) p 1 (t) = b 1 (t)p 1 (t) − b 1 (t) p 1 (t 24) and P 1 (·) = E µ 1 (t) − µ 1 (t) µ 1 (t) − µ 1 (t) τ = E µ 1 (t) − µ 1 (t) µ 1 (t) − µ 1 (t) τ |F 29) and P 2 (·) = E µ 2 (t) − µ 2 (t) µ 2 (t) − µ 2 (t) τ = E µ 2 (t) − µ 2 (t) µ 2 (t) − µ 2 (t) τ |F 
